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„…the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations – the grand object of all enquiries in Po-
litical Economy“ 
Malthus to Ricardo in a letter from 1817.
1 
1  Introduction 
Just a couple of decades ago, most economists took pride in not resorting to factors like cul-
ture or institutions when explaining economic growth. This has dramatically changed. Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2004) claim, e.g., that “institutions rule” and argue that institutions 
dominate alternative explanations for long-run economic performance such as geography or 
economic integration. With regard to constitutions (often interpreted as the most basic layer of 
formal institutions), Persson & Tabellini (2003) show that a number of constitutional rules 
(e.g. referring to the voting system) have far-reaching consequences on various economic va-
riables, including total factor productivity. 
Representatives of related research programs have made similar claims: Putnam (1993) claims 
that the degree of civil society is an important long-run determinant for a number of outcome 
variables. Social capital researchers usually claim that the level of trust as well as the degree 
to which citizens participate in voluntary associations are important determinants of economic 
development. 
These developments are important for understanding the causes of the wealth and poverty of 
nations. Yet, we need to dig deeper into these causes. After all, institutions are not exogenous-
ly given but rather the outcome of (collective) choice. We thus need to explain why some so-
cieties choose welfare-enhancing institutions, whereas others seem to be stuck with inefficient 
ones. In this paper, we argue that the values and norms held by substantial parts of a society’s 
members are an important determinant of its institutions. We further conjecture that values 
and norms exert both a direct and an indirect effect on economic development: the direct ef-
fect materializes e.g. because values and norms also contain the work ethic which, if trans-
formed into behavior, should have direct consequences on economic development. The indi-
rect effect is conjectured to work via the relevant institutions: if institutions are important for 
economic development and institutions are influenced by the values and norms, then this is a 
more indirect channel through which values and norms can display their impact. 
We did find that many of our proxies for values and norms have either a direct or an indirect 
                                                 
1 Quoted from Landes (1999).   3
effect on total factor productivity which is our proxy for economic development. Some prox-
ies have either a direct or an indirect effect, others show both direct and indirect effects. The 
degree of social capital seems to be an important intermediary determinant for economic de-
velopment, in that many of the indirect effects are expressed via social capital. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section contains our theoretical conjectures. Sec-
tion three serves to discuss possibilities to put the theoretical conjectures to an empirical test. 
Section four presents the estimation approach – as well as the data – used. Section five is a 
discussion of the results and in section six some open questions are shortly mentioned. 
2  Theory 
It is the aim of this paper to go beyond the current wisdom of institutional economics. The 
New Institutional Economics has been a huge success and we simply assume that “institutions 
matter”. Although there is lots of evidence in favor of this assumption, it is by no means un-
iversally accepted
2. For lack of space, we simply go with the assumption that institutions do 
matter. 
We define institutions as commonly known rules used to structure recurrent interaction situa-
tions that are endowed with a sanctioning mechanism whose application is threatened in case 
the rule part is not complied with. Both the rule of law as well as constitutional democracy 
(our two proxies for institutions) are, strictly speaking, not institutions because they are made 
up of dozens or even hundreds of different institutions. In order to keep things simple, we 
propose to call them institutional systems assuming that there is a minimum amount of inter-
nal consistency among the many single institutions. In Figure 1, the assumption that institu-
tions matter is reflected by the arrows from the rule of law and democracy to the box econom-
ic outcomes. 
                                                 













The most important trait of the rule of law is that the law is to be applied equally to all per-
sons (isonomia), government leaders included. It is therefore also called government under 
the law. No power used by government is arbitrary, all power is limited. Drawing on Kant 
(1797/1995), laws should normatively fulfill the criterion of universalizability, which has 
been interpreted to mean that the law should be (1) general, i.e., applicable to an unforeseea-
ble number of persons and circumstances, (2) abstract, i.e., not prescribing a certain behavior 
but simply proscribing a finite number of actions, (3) certain, (anyone interested in discover-
ing whether a certain behavior will be legal can do so with a fairly high chance of being cor-
rect and can furthermore expect that today’s rules will also be tomorrow’s rules) and (4) justi-
fiable in rational discourse between any persons
3. 
Hayek (1960: 227) has argued that the rule of law would necessarily imply a market economy 
(i.e. secure private property rights and the freedom of contract), since decisions by the gov-
ernment about who is to produce what in what quantities cannot be subsumed under general 
rules but imply the arbitrary discrimination between persons. Individual liberty is exempt 
from arbitrary interference by government – or other powerful groups – only if it is secured 
by an effectively enforced rule of law. Logically, a rule-of-law constitution does not imply 
that the political system will be democratic. That is why we deal separately with constitutional 
democracy. 
The concept of constitutionalism was developed primarily by settlers in the British colonies of 
North America. It links the rule of law with the notion of a written constitution in which the 
                                                 
3 A number of institutional provisions typically support the rule of law. Among the most important ones are the separation of 
powers, the prohibition of retroactive legislation, the prohibition of expropriation without just compensation, habeas corpus, 
and other procedural devices such as protection of confidence, the principle of the least disruptive intervention, the principle 
of proportionality, and the like.   5
basic procedures that government is to use are laid down. Constitutionalism is thus a norma-
tive concept not to be confused with the de facto constitution used by any society, which has 
achieved a minimum amount of order to produce and finance public goods. 
A constitution can be defined as the rules based on which a society makes its decisions con-
cerning the provision and financing of public goods. Democracies are called constitutional if 
the domains to which majoritarian procedures may be applied are limited. A democratic con-
stitution contains specific procedures concerning the choice (and the substitution) of those 
who are to make decisions concerning the provision of public goods and who have the power 
to tax even those who are not in favor of a specific bundle of public goods to be provided. 
Market economies are based on a specific concept concerning the role of the individual: the 
individual is the only “unit” that can think and act responsibly and that is capable of pursuing 
goals responsibly. This position is often subsumed under the heading of ‘methodological in-
dividualism’. Market economies are further based on the presumption of (individual) freedom 
in the sense of “a condition … in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for their pur-
poses, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application …” (Hayek (1973: 55). 
These concepts form the basis for guaranteeing private autonomy, which in the economic 
sphere translates into the freedom to contract. The freedom to contract only makes sense if 
private property is secure and widely respected. The freedom to contract can furthermore only 
enhance overall welfare if contracts voluntarily entered into are subsequently adhered to. We 
have thus arrived at Hume’s three fundamental laws of culture: “the stability of possession, of 
its transference by consent, and the performance of promises”
4. Functionally, the provisions 
hitherto mentioned could be said to solve the problem of who has the competence to decide 
the use of factors and goods in a market economy. 
The coordination of individual decisions that will most likely not be compatible with each 
other ex ante, is brought about by competition and the price system. If the questions concern-
ing competence are answered in the way just outlined, competition cannot be used as an in-
strument to achieve specific goals defined by a central authority, but must be modeled as an 
open process whose specific results are systematically unpredictable. This trait is best cap-
tured by the title of Hayek’s seminal paper, “Competition as a discovery procedure”
5. This 
understanding of competition also points to the fact that competition helps market actors to 
discover new knowledge, e.g. in the form of technical progress. If innovations are successful, 
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they will most likely draw some demand away from competing suppliers, which may lead to a 
certain devaluation of their property rights. The existence – and acceptance – of such pecu-
niary externalities is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. 
But the functions of competition do not stop here. If a similar product is offered by more than 
one supplier or if there is even the possibility of new entrants into the market, the probability 
of substitution gives buyers more power over suppliers. The permanent threat of suppliers to 
be negatively sanctioned by the other market-side, including the threat of being forced out of 
the market entirely, produces positive incentives for suppliers. When property rights enable 
entrepreneurs to appropriate the profits from their economic activities, entrepreneurs have 
every reason to behave innovatively. 
Empirically, there is little doubt that a rule of law is correlated with high income levels. The 
relationship from democracy to income and growth is less clear. In fact, a debate concerning 
the more plausible direction of causality (from democracy to growth or from growth to de-
mocracy) was kicked off by Lipset (1959) and has not been settled until today
6. What is clear, 
however, is that different countries realize vastly different levels of both the rule of law as 
well as of constitutional democracy. 
Representatives of political economy have recently proposed a number of explanations based 
on the power of the ruling elite
7. According to these approaches, both institutional systems are 
the consequence of the (relative) power that the ruling class enjoys. Various versions of this 
approach exist: Barzel (1997) has, e.g., argued that strong elites will more readily enter into 
institutional arrangements that constrain governments if they are strong. Only strong regimes 
are able to reap the additional benefits accruing from the increased levels of credibility that 
follow from these institutional systems. Voigt (1999) has argued that government strength as 
well as the number of veto players is crucial for institutional development: if some groups 
have the capacity to prevent a cooperation rent from being produced, then these groups will 
become part of a “factual social contract”. The higher the number of these groups, the more 
general will the rules be – in other words: the higher the likelihood to observe the rule of law. 
Bargaining for fundamental institutional change with the current ruling elite presupposes the 
ability of groups to act collectively. It seems plausible to suppose that it is easier for organized 
groups than for unorganized individuals to act collectively because organized groups have al-
                                                 
6 Sunde (2006) is a recent survey of the main arguments, while Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson & Yared (2007) represents the 
most recent argument against a causal effect from growth to democracy. 
7 See for example Acemoglu & Robinson (2006).   7
ready solved the problem of collective action. Olson (1965) has shown that many potential in-
terest groups never manage to become effective interest groups because they are unable to 
solve the problem of collective action, which is basically a free rider problem
8. Robert Put-
nam (1993) argues that the performance of democratic institutions does not only hinge upon 
their formal set-up but also upon civic traditions. His argument could be read as being in di-
rect opposition to Olson's: the larger the number of voluntary associations, the higher the de-
gree of civicness and thus the performance of democratic institutions
9. 
Figure 1 shows that we hypothesize the capacity to act collectively (which is called social 
capital or civil society there) to have an impact on the institutional systems realized. But so-
cial capital (or civil society) is for its part the (collective) result of individual behavior. We 
conjecture that the quality as well as the quantity of social capital that can be found anywhere 
is determined, or at least heavily influenced, by the values and norms prevalent in a society. 
The political economy approach of endogenizing institutional systems can also be thought of 
as a “top down” approach. This can be complemented by a “bottom up” approach which 
draws directly on values and norms held by individuals. Since this approach is rather novel, 
we describe it in a little more detail here. 
Values have been defined as “… conceptions of the desirable, influencing selective behavior” 
(International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences). A cluster of values will also be called a 
value-system. Norms for conduct can be distinguished from values:  
“Values are not the same as norms for conduct. … Values are standards of desirability 
that are more independent of specific situations. The same value may be a point of refer-
ence for a great many specific norms; a particular norm may represent the simultaneous 
application of several separable values” (ibid.).  
The values and norms prevalent in a society are an important determinant of the running cost 
                                                 
8 In his Rise and Decline of Nations, he argues that within stable regimes, ever more latent interest groups will manage to be-
come manifest interest groups (Olson (1982)). Ever more interest groups will be successful in their rent seeking endeavors 
which will lead to stagflation, rigidities and reduced economic growth. Olson is not directly concerned with the rule of law 
but his analysis bears direct implications on our topic: the larger the number of organized interest groups, the higher the 
probability that the rule of law will suffer due to privileges granted to specific groups. As long as interest groups are not in-
clusive of the interests of all citizens (or "super-encompassing" as Olson later [McGuire & Olson (1996)] wrote), their exis-
tence has to be evaluated negatively. By focusing on the intended consequences of collective action, Olson arrives at the con-
clusion that interest groups are a threat to the rule of law. 
9 Not every organization will have such beneficial effects, however: only horizontally organized associations will foster co-
operation and trust. Putnam's argument is based on the concept of Civil Society which can be traced back to Ferguson (1988) 
and Tocqueville (1840/1945). Its adherents claim that a balance of power between government on the one side and a number 
of voluntary associations on the other would be possible (for an overview, see Gellner (1994). Although Putnam does not 
deal with the consequences of civil associations' activities on the possibility to sustain a rule of law-constitution, a causal re-
lationship can easily be established: the larger the number of associations, the higher the chance that a relevant number will 
protest if government tries to renege upon the constitution.   8
of institutional systems. Remember that institutions are endowed with the threat of sanction in 
case of non-compliance with the rule component. If sanctioning relies exclusively on the state 
(the police, prosecutors etc.) and is not complemented by enforcement from within society, 
running institutional systems is a lot more costly than if most (or even all) enforcement is 
done without having to rely on the visible hand of the state. The cost of running institutional 
systems will, in turn, be crucial for their sustainability over time. 
Formulated in terms of a hypothesis: 
Institutional systems largely compatible with the prevalent values and norms of a so-
ciety are more likely to survive than institutional systems largely incompatible with 
the prevalent values and norms.. 
This implies that – at least in the long run – there would be a close correspondence between 
values and norms on the one hand and institutional systems on the other (since institutional 
systems incompatible with the prevalent values and norms are likely to disappear). 
Yet, it would be naïve to attribute prevalent institutional systems exclusively to values and 
norms. Actors commanding power can incur heavy costs to keep institutional systems alive 
although they are incompatible with the prevalent values and norms. The conjecture is, hence, 
that the political economy approach and the values and norms approach are not mutually ex-
clusive but that they both play a role. Economic development depends both on values and 
norms conducive to it (both directly and indirectly, see Figure 1) and on those preconditions 
usually considered within political economy approaches. 
There is a plethora of potentially relevant political economy factors and instruments to sup-
press individual freedom and, hence, to prevent values and norms held by individuals to trans-
late into behavior: the military, the police, the capacity to restrict access to necessary re-
sources and so on. To keep the theory simple, we propose to follow Hayek (1973: 55) and ar-
gue that economic development will be faster in situations “… in which all are allowed to use 
their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal appli-
cation …”. Economic development depends on the degree of freedom that individual actors 
experience. Formulated as a hypothesis: 
Economic development is conjectured to be fastest when favorable values and norms 
are complemented by a high degree of freedom secured via the institutional system. 
It would, of course, be interesting to inquire more deeply into the functional relationship be-
tween these two causes. This will, however, not be pursued here. Instead, we propose to dig a   9
bit deeper into the question of which values and norms have positive effects on economic de-
velopment (both directly and indirectly). 
The fundamental hypothesis underlying our “list of favorable values and norms” is that eco-
nomic systems that are based on individual liberty have proven to provide the greatest chance 
to enhance individual wealth. The list names some of the attitudes that seem to be either ne-
cessary for or favorable to growth in an economic system based on individual liberty. These 
attitudes would have to be backed by a value-system and its corresponding norms:
10 
(1) It is the individual actor who is responsible for decision-making, for carrying out 
the decisions and for reaching – or not reaching – his goals.  
If success in life is, however, perceived of as being largely out of the individual's control and 
seen as being determined by God, destiny or some organic entity, we would not expect a mar-
ket economy that is based on private autonomy and that depends on entrepreneurial spirit to 
develop. The view of the individual who is responsible for the actions committed is a neces-
sary prerequisite for the establishment of private property rights because conceptually, it is 
them that grant the individual actor the chance to incorporate the benefits arising as a conse-
quence of her actions as well as attribute to her the responsibility to bear the costs.
11 It is con-
jectured that the view of the individual as being largely responsible for his own fate displays a 
direct as well as an indirect effect: individuals with such norms will try to be better off eco-
nomically (direct effect) but will also be actively involved in establishing institutions granting 
them the individual freedom that they strive for. In a similar manner, Casson (1993: 424-425) 
points out the importance of an “atomistic morality” for long-run economic development, em-
phasizing individual rights rather than social obligations. 
(2) Individuals who are doing exceptionally well economically are perceived as role 
models rather than being looked at enviously.  
This implies that the perceived inequality of economic outcomes is accepted as long as it is 
legally attained. This is not to imply that inequality either of property or of income is neces-
sarily a prerequisite for a market economy and economic growth
12. It is conjectured that such 
norms display a positive direct effect whereas the indirect effect appears more uncertain: ac-
                                                 
10 In a slightly different form, the following list first appeared in Voigt (1993). Some theory on this can also be found in Cas-
son (1993). 
11 Hofstede (1997: 51) describes individualistic societies as “societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: every-
one is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family.” 
12 Hofstede (1997: 164 f.) introduces the dimension “Confucian dynamism” that bears resemblance with these norms. What 
he has in mind is the degree to which a society encourages (and rewards) group members for good performance.   10
cepting large inequality could mean that individuals do not actively try to establish rules treat-
ing everybody equally, in other words, this norm could be a hindrance for the establishment of 
the rule of law. 
(3) Individuals are geographically and socially mobile.  
Geographic mobility is a favorable attitude because it enables the mobile factors to combine 
their inputs with other – immobile – factors. High geographical mobility ensures the possibili-
ty of putting the factors to their most valued use. In order to enhance market systems, this atti-
tude must also be shared by those who are immobile, i.e. those at the ‘recipient end’. If they 
share a militant aversion against strangers – for example because they constitute a source of 
competition on the labor-market possibly leading to lower wages – potential economic growth 
will not be realized.  
Social mobility includes upward as well as downward mobility. It is favorable to market sys-
tems if people moving up the social ladder are not looked at enviously but are rather per-
ceived as role models. Downward social mobility should ideally not be accompanied by stig-
matizing those who have moved down the social ladder. 
(4) Individuals do not share a militant aversion against anything unknown.  
Market economies thrive on the basis of competition and competition means that innovative 
behavior is rewarded. But innovations can also occur with regard to political institutions. It is, 
hence, argued that values and norms trying to conserve the status quo are not conducive to 
economic development. It is conjectured that there is a direct effect as well as an indirect ef-
fect
13. The direct effect is, e.g., expected to work via the propensity to act as a “consumption 
pioneer” whereas the indirect effect materializes because such societies are not only likely to 
experiment with political institutions but also to find those that are more conducive to aggre-
gate welfare. 
(5) Equal treatment of all persons.  
Traditionally, many societies have made important distinctions between natives and foreign-
ers, between believers and infidels, between men and women. The higher the degree to which 
such unequal treatment is backed up by corresponding values und norms, the lower the 
chances for economic development as this unequal treatment implies that human capital is mi-
                                                 
13 Hofstede (1997: 109 ff.) introduces a dimension that he calls “uncertainty avoidance” which depicts the extent to which in-
dividuals follow norms that reduce uncertainty. This dimension is very similar to what we have in mind.   11
sallocated or not used at all. Again, we would expect both a direct and an indirect effect: the 
direct effect will work through the more efficient allocation of talent whereas the indirect ef-
fect is conjectured to work via better political institutions making the efficient allocation of 
human capital easier. 
(6) Values and norms encouraging involvement in community affairs. 
These norms could be beneficial for the development of political institutions if they help the 
relevant populations to overcome the problem of collective action. They might display a more 
important effect if they come along with norms solving – or at least reducing – the free rider 
problem. This effect is conjectured to materialize primarily indirectly. 
(7) Refusal to accept hierarchies  
This norm is conjectured to be important for the way people interact in society. It can relate to 
all sorts of hierarchies, including firms but also the state. If hierarchies – and the orders issued 
by them – are accepted without discussion, this would seem to make survival for autocrats 
easier. It is, hence, conjectured that a high propensity will most likely be connected with un-
democratic political institutions. The direct effect is not as clear-cut: on the one hand, a cer-
tain degree of accepting superiors’ decisions is necessary for firms to function effectively. On 
the other hand, hierarchies require new ideas and proposals for their development. At the ex-
treme, one could think of values and norms not accepting any hierarchies whatsoever. This 
could imply that firms would be far below optimum size and would, hence, have a negative 
direct effect
14. 
(8) Individuals share some 'lesser virtues' such as being honest, being on time, not 
cheating on each other etc.  
If a person can reasonably expect that another person unknown to her will e.g. stick to his 
promises, this will greatly decrease the costs of transacting thus making exchange less com-
plicated and less costly
15. Other values and norms conducive to economic development in-
clude thriftiness, diligence and tidiness. All these virtues should display a direct effect. A cer-
tain degree of thriftiness is a necessary condition for economic development, without it, no 
investment is possible. A high degree of thriftiness can therefore also be interpreted as a for-
ward-looking attitude or future-orientation. 
                                                 
14 Hofstede (1997: 23 ff.) introduces the dimension “power distance” closely resembling the aspects discussed here. 
15 See e.g. Casson (1993: 425-427).   12
 
Of course, some of the attitudes described as favorable to an economic system based on de-
centralized co-ordination are not backed up by corresponding norms in societies that have 
long been coordinated in this way. It seems to be essential, however, that the people who do 
share the above-mentioned attitudes are not hindered actively by those parts of the population 
who do not share them. In other words: it might not be necessary that the listed attitudes are 
actively backed up by corresponding norms (and values) but that there are no norms that pu-
nish those who share them. Thus, if there are umbrella-norms which secure that people who 
do behave according to some of the above-mentioned attitudes will be sanctioned because 
they break some traditional norm, prospects for economic growth are predicted to be pretty 
slim. 
3  Possibilities to Put the Theory to an Empirical Test 
We are interested in the determinants of long-run economic development. Our conjecture is 
that it is not primarily elites that determine development but that the values and norms held by 
substantial groups of society also play an important role. In order to test this hypothesis, it 
would be ideal to have indicators for the values and norms held in various countries a long 
time ago, say around 1900. In this section, we discuss possibilities to put the theory to an em-
pirical test. Due to lack of available data, only a fraction of the possibilities discussed can be 
pursued in this work. 
Since the value-system offers the individual a reference-system that helps her to determine the 
things she does and helps her to order things in an otherwise unordered world, it is unlikely 
that a person will frequently change parts of her value-system or even the entire system. In 
other words: values are assumed to be relatively time-invariant. They should be primarily de-
termined during a person's childhood
16. Indicators for the prevalent values in a society would 
therefore have to be found in the values that children are taught. We think that a society's 
fairy-tales that have often endured over decades or even centuries would be the most reliable 
indicator because they have come to reflect the shared value-system of a society. Different 
from fairy-tales, newly released children’s books might also reflect the aspirations and dispo-
sitions of their authors and might therefore, especially in totalitarian states, reflect more the 
values of the nomenclature than those of the people. Unfortunately, we will not be able to 
draw extensively on fairy-tales as an indicator in this paper as comparative research into fairy-
                                                 
16 For evidence on this, see Goodnow (1997) and Knafo & Schwartz (2004).   13
tales has not compared the values and norms emphasized by various fairy-tales. 
A second indicator reflecting the values shared in a society might be found by analyzing its 
religion. This approach can be traced back to Max Weber who analyzed many religions with 
regard to their ‘economic ethics’ which he understood as “...not the ethical theory of theologi-
cal compendia ... but the practical impulses for action that are based on the psychological 
and pragmatic connections of the religion”
17. It might be argued that the economic ethics of 
the respective religions had become largely irrelevant because people had long ceased to be 
religious. Yet, economic ethics can continue to influence the behavior of people long after 
they have ceased to view themselves as religious. 
A mapping between the economic ethics of religions and values and norms would be ideal. 
Additionally, a number of issues ought to be reflected in any indicator: the intensity of reli-
gious beliefs could be important. People never attending any religious ceremonies might be 
less guided by values and norms than people regularly doing so. This could well be reflected 
in their behavior. We are here not only interested in the effect of religions on individual beha-
vior but also on collective outcomes. This implies that the ratio of people following a certain 
religion should be controlled for. It would, hence, be ideal to use information on the intensity 
of religious beliefs from some 100 years ago. Unfortunately, we did not find any such data for 
a large number of countries
18. 
A third possible indicator could rely on public opinion polls that contain questions concerning 
the prevalent values. One problem with such surveys is that they might reflect the attitudes 
and dispositions that the interviewees think they should have or that they think the group of 
people that they most identify with would have. Yet, highly professional survey organizations 
know how to deal with these issues and the responses can tell us quite about the values and 
norms that real people hold. Previous work by Granato, Inglehart & Leblang (1996) has used 
this approach, though with an emphasis on growth rather than levels of development. In a re-
cent work closer to this one, Licht, Goldschmidt & Schwartz (2007) use survey data collected 
by Schwartz (2004)
19 to correlate cultural dimensions with “the rule of law, corruption and 
democratic accountability” (p. 659). We expand the framework of Licht et al. (2007) by (1) 
using a greater diversity of value dimensions and (2) employing a more general estimation 
                                                 
17 Weber (1921/1980: 238). 
18 A number of recent studies have found various effects attributed to religions. For an overview, see McCleary & Barro 
(2006) and Barro & McCleary (2003). 
19 We do not employ the Schwartz data in this study. Evidence by Pryor (2007) and Pryor (2008) suggests that the WVS data 
and the Schwartz data are similar.   14
approach. 
4  The Estimation Approach  
The main focus of this paper is on long-term development – and not on short-term growth. 
This is why we are interested in explaining income levels rather than growth rates. After all, 
income levels are nothing but aggregate growth rates over a very long time. As our assump-
tion is that institutions matter, we are interested in isolating their effects from the effects of 
the other factors contributing to growth – and income. This is why we use the Solow-residual 
as the dependent variable
20. 
Hall & Jones (1999) conjecture that “social infrastructure” is crucial to explaining variation in 
total factor productivity (TFP) across countries. Their proxies for social infrastructure include 
law and order, bureaucratic quality, risk of government repudiation of contracts, the degree of 
(perceived) corruption but also the openness of an economy to international trade. We pro-
pose to start where Hall and Jones ended. They are, of course, aware of the possibility that 
beneficial social infrastructure might for its part be the result of high incomes, i.e. of reverse 
causality. To control for that possibility, they rely on an instrumental variables approach using 
a country’s latitude as well as the degree to which European languages as spoken as native 
languages as instruments. 
Our analysis adapts their central idea that total factor productivity is mainly determined by 
social infrastructure, but with several modifications. Firstly, we explicitly allow both Social 
Capital (CIVIL) and Values and Norms (VN) to influence economic performance (TFP), the 
former indirectly, the latter directly and indirectly (see Figure 1). We thus model Values and 
Norms as exogenous and Social Capital as endogenous. We justify the former assumption by 
the relative time-invariance of our proxies for Values and Norms
21. The latter assumption im-
plies that we are now dealing with three instead of Hall and Jones’ two simultaneous structur-
al equations: the first determines TFP, the second determines institutional quality and the third 
determines Social Capital. Considering any of the three equations separately would lead to se-
rious endogeneity problems, which is why we estimate them simultaneously
22. Note that we 
explicitly allow for Values and Norms to influence economic performance directly and indi-
rectly. 
                                                 
20 The Solow residual is the fraction of output that cannot be explained by the endowment with capital and labor. 
21 See Inglehart & Baker (2000). For further evidence, see Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2005) and Schwartz, Bardi & Bianc-
hi (2000). Finally, Pryor (2007) and Pryor (2008) provide evidence that economic systems (i.e. systems of institutions) are 
determined by values rather than the other way around. 
22 This is in contrast to an approach with separate estimations, such as in Andonova, Zuleta & Castillo (2007).   15
 
Where i indexes countries, TFP is total factor productivity, VN is a proxy for values and 
norms, INST is an indicator of institutional quality, CIVIL is our Social Capital indicator and 
X, Y and Z are control variables. We cannot estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) separately with 
OLS because we have to assume that INST and CIVIL are correlated with the respective error 
term. One solution to this is an instrumental variables approach. 
Note that we explicitly include the proxy for Values and Norms in all three structural equa-
tions in order to allow for direct as well as indirect effects on economic performance. Identifi-
cation of our structural parameters hinges on the number of purely exogenous variables we 
include in the control vectors. Thus, in our first step, we determine which exogenous variables 
tend to explain TFP, INST and CIVIL best, respectively. Using the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (see Raftery (1995)), we establish the respective 3x1 vector of control variables that is 
most probable to explain variations in TFP, INST and CIVIL. Table 1 lists all instruments 
used
23. 
In the next step, we estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) simultaneously using 3 stage least 
squares. This involves utilizing all purely exogenous variables in our system as instruments 
for all endogenous variables and estimating each structural equation using the instrumented 
values of the endogenous variables on the right-hand side with Generalized Least Squares (see 
Greene (2003: 405-407))
24. 
Beyond the variables used by Hall and Jones for social infrastructure, we propose to use the 
World Bank indicator for “rule of law”
25. In additional estimations, the PolityIV indicators for 
“constitutional democracy”
26  and “constraints on the executive”
27  are employed. This ap-
                                                 
23 We restrict ourselves to three control variables for reasons of parsimony and sample size. 
24 Thus, 2 stage least squares is merely a special case of 3 stage least squares. 
25 Rule of law measures the extent to which individuals “have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particu-
larly, the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Kauf-
man, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2007: 4). The governance indicators in general and the rule of law indicator in particular have 
come under heavy attack recently (see, e.g., Arndt & Oman (2006), Kurtz & Schrank (2007b), Kurtz & Schrank (2007a) 
orThomas (2007)). Voigt (2008) discusses some of the issues involved in the attempts to make institutions measurable. For 
lack of a better measure, we continue to use this one, despite its various shortcomings. 
26 “Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of in-
stitutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in 
their daily lives and in acts of political participation.” Marshall & Jaggers (2004: 13). 
27 Measures “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals 
or collectivities.“ Marshall & Jaggers (2004: 23).   16
proach will be run for various indicators proxying the dimensions of values and norms men-
tioned in section 2. We hope that this model appropriately captures the effects of values and 
norms that are mediated via the institutional system of society.  
5  Data and Estimation Results 
We now turn to describe the data used in this paper: the dependent variable is taken from Hall 
and Jones. Following Hall & Jones (1999), we calculate productivity as the residual of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Hall and Jones provide data for 1988, we recalculate them 
for the year 2000.  
Some of the data proxying for values and norms are taken from the so-called GLOBE study 
on culture, leadership and organization
28. GLOBE is an acronym derived from “Global Lea-
dership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program”. As the name indicates, 
the participants of the research project are interested in the consequences of different values 
and norms for firm behavior, in particular different leadership models. But some of the nine 
dimensions that they work with mirror our list of favorable values and norms rather closely, 
so that their data can be meaningfully applied to the central question of this paper. The 
GLOBE data are based on questionnaire responses of 17,300 middle managers in 951 firms 
and 62 societies.
29 All respondents are from three industries namely (1) food processing, (2) 
financial services and (3) telecommunication services. A little more than one quarter of all 
respondents are female. The data were collected during the middle of the 1990s. The GLOBE 
data systematically distinguish societal practice (“as is”) and societal values (“should be”) in 
all nine dimensions covered by the survey, on a scale from 1 to 7. Interestingly, the “as is” 
and the “should be” dimensions are significantly and negatively correlated respectively. Hofs-
tede (2006: 885-886) argues that this is basically due to a measurement problem in the 
GLOBE survey questionnaire. “As is” value are inherently hard to assess for individuals, and 
furthermore, the survey questions for the “as is” dimensions were overly abstract. This leads 
Hofstede to conclude that the “as is” dimension actually reflected their “should be” assess-
ments, mostly by criticizing their respective society (hence the negative correlation).  
Potentially, the focus on the middle-management of only three branches constitutes a problem 
since these persons might not be representative of their societies, resulting in sample selection 
                                                 
28 House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta (2004). 
29 The number of countries is a bit lower because some countries were represented more than once (namely the former East 
vs. the former West Germany, French-Speaking vs. non-French-Speaking Switzerland, and a black vs. a white sample with 
regard to South Africa).   17
bias. However, correlations with both objective data as well as with other surveys (such as the 
World Values Survey) indicate that this is not a serious problem
30. 
But the GLOBE project does not cover our list of favorable values and norms in its entirety. 
This is why we need to draw on other data sources to cover the missing parts of the list. Our 
second important source is the World Values Survey that has been carried out in four waves 
to date. Face-to-face interviews have been conducted in 65 countries and each interview cov-
ers up to 350 questions
31. 
For each of the seven categories of Values and Norms
32, we performed factor analysis to iden-
tify common factors among the different individual variables from the GLOBE and the WVS 
study
33. This approach puts emphasis on the exploratory nature of our analysis
34. Strong cor-
relations between the respective GLOBE common factors (for “as is” and “should be”) and 
WVS dimensions indicates similar constructs were measured in the two surveys. Therefore, 
we will be using the common factor of both whenever possible. 
According to Figure 1, civil society is conjectured to be influenced by values and norms – and 
to have an impact on institutional systems. In order to identify the unmediated effect of values 
and norms on institutional systems, it is hence important to control for the strength of civil so-
ciety. We do this by relying on an indicator proposed by Paxton (2002). It consists of the 
number of international non-governmental organizations (INGO) present in a country. As ar-
gued above, existing associations are conjectured to reduce the problem of collective action 
substantially. Therefore, it seems a good proxy. It could be argued that the proportion of in-
ternational nongovernmental organizations among all NGOs could differ substantially be-
tween countries. This is, of course, true – and a disadvantage of the measure. On the other 
hand, international contacts could be an important aspect in the activities of NGOs. In that 
sense, this measure appears very promising. The INGO-count is available for a very large 
number of countries and for a number of years. As a given increase in INGO is expected to 
have more effects in countries with a small number of them, we used the log (of the INGO 
count variable in 2000) to construct this variable. As further indicator of civil society, we util-
ize the WVS variable concerning general trust. 
                                                 
30 See Gupta, Sully de Luque & House (2004). 
31 For details, see World Values Study Group (1999). 
32 True, in section 2 eight attitudes were shortly discussed. Unfortunately, we were not able to find any variables proxying for 
geographic and/or social mobility such that the number of empirically tested attitudes falls to seven. 
33 For a different approach, see Granato et al. (1996: 611). 
34 Andonova et al. (2007) also use factor analysis, but in their work, its purpose is to identify a common factor underlying the 
different dimensions of cultural values.   18
We now present the operationalizations of the seven groups of Values and Norms identified in 
Section 2, reporting the respective estimation results in parallel. 
(1) Individual responsible for achieving goals 
The GLOBE project contains a dimension entitled Performance Orientation which refers to 
the extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards individual group mem-
bers for performance improvement and excellence.  
The World Values Survey (WVS)
35 contains a number of variables indicating to which degree 
populations in various countries share this norm. We choose two of them. The first one (ques-
tion V95) asks respondents to assess on a scale “how much freedom of choice and control you 
feel you have over the way your life turns out”, we call it Perceived Freedom of Choice. The 
second one (question V252) asks to assess one’s view on a scale between “Individuals should 
take more responsibility for providing for themselves” and “The state should take more re-
sponsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”, we call this one Preference for individu-
al responsibility. Our factor analysis indicates two separate factors, one mainly composed of 
the WVS dimensions (Individual responsibility), and the other representing the GLOBE di-
mensions (Performance orientation). 
Our results indicate that a higher appreciation of individual responsibility is associated with 
higher economic performance (Table 4, columns 4 and 7). Furthermore, we find that Individ-
ual responsibility (WVS) might indirectly influence economic performance via INGO (col-
umns 3, 6 and 9), although it is unclear in what way INGO for its part affects economic per-
formance (columns 1, 4 and 7). The GLOBE common factor for Performance orientation in-
fluences performance via Rule of law (Table 5, column 3). 
(2) Inequality Accepted 
Here, we rely exclusively on two variables drawn from the WVS, namely V125 (Secretary 
Fairness
36) and V250 (Incomes should be made more equal
37). We combine these variables in 
a common factor called Inequality acceptance. 
                                                 
35 We aggregate the WVS individual level data over each country and over all four waves. The latter can be justified by the 
relatively strong time-invariance of responses. Theoretical justification for this can be found in Roland (2004), while empiri-
cal evidence can be found in Schwartz et al. (2000) and Inglehart & Baker (2000). 
36 “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns $50 a week 
more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opi-
nion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?” World Values Study Group (1999: 16). 
37 Here, respondents were asked to choose on a scale between “Incomes should be made more equal” and “There should be 
greater incentives for individual effort.” World Values Study Group (1999: 27).   19
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 
3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one system of equations, estimated with GLS using in-
strumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported. 
Table 6 shows that the willingness to accept inequalities is not conducive to economic per-
formance either directly or indirectly. This result is definitely not in line with our expectations. 
(3) No Aversion Against Unknown 
Sully de Luque & Javidan (2004: 603) define uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which 
members of collectives seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formalized procedures, and 
laws to cover situations in their daily lives.” The dimension Uncertainty Avoidance was in-
spired by similar constructs, e.g. Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index.  
The conjecture is that lower aversion against anything unknown fosters innovation, which 
would then be conducive to economic development. The indirect effects of uncertainty avoid-
ance are somewhat more difficult to grasp: if societies are more willing to accept uncertainty, 
the number of laws and regulations could be lower than in societies having a harder time to 
tolerate uncertainty. Ex ante, the effect of this is, however, unpredictable: on the one hand, 
this could mean that there are less laws and regulations constraining entrepreneurial behavior 
and innovation. On the other, if laws and regulations make the environment less uncertain und 
more predictable, this could also spur additional entrepreneurial activity. It might hence be 
important to distinguish the direct from the indirect effects of uncertainty avoidance. 
In the WVS, questions V69 to V82 ask respondents to choose from a list any group of people 
that they would not like to have as their neighbor. Those groups include “People with a crimi-
nal record”, “Heavy drinkers”, “Muslims”, People who have AIDS” and so on. Our variable 
Uncertainty Avoidance (WVS) counts the number of groups that respondents mentioned. The 
common factor Uncertainty avoidance includes the WVS variable as well as the above men-
tioned GLOBE dimensions. 
As can be seen in Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations 
were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one system of equations, es-
timated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported. 
Table 7, Uncertainty avoidance has a robustly negative impact via INGO (columns 3, 6 and 9), 
while showing a negative direct impact on performance when using Constitutional democracy 
or Executive constraints as institutional proxies (columns 4 and 7). Additionally, it influences 
performance indirectly via Rule of law (column 2). 
 (4) Equality of Treatment   20
Equality of treatment refers to the equality before the law tout court. Encompassing indicators 
for this do not seem to be available. The GLOBE project does, however, contain the dimen-
sion Gender Egalitarianism that proxies for one important, if not the most important, dimen-
sion with regard to the equality of treatment. Emrich, Denmark & Den Hartog (2004: 347) de-
fine it as reflecting “societies’ beliefs about whether members’ biological sex should deter-
mine the roles that they play in their homes, business organizations, and communities.” 
The WVS contains two corresponding variables. The first (V130) asks respondents whether 
they agree to the statement “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women”. 
The second one states “Men make better political leaders than women do” (V118). 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 
3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one system of equations, estimated with GLS using in-
strumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported. 
Table 8 shows that our common factor for the value Equal treatment does not impact on TFP 
directly. However, there is some evidence that it influences performance indirectly via INGO 
(columns 3, 6 and 9). 
 (5) Interest in the Public Good 
This dimension is expected to display an effect indirectly rather than directly, namely via the 
higher quality of institutions that are prerequisite for economic development.  
Here, we use four variables from the WVS: Accept tax increase if used to prevent pollution
38, 
Belongs to some organization
39, Does unpaid work for some organization
40, Participation in 
political action
41. Factor analysis reveals two underlying factors, the first relating to the first 
three variables (we call it Contribution to public good), the second relating solely to Partici-
pation in political action. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 
3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one system of equations, estimated with GLS using in-
strumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported. 
Table 9 shows that the first factor, Contribution to public good, does not seem to impact in 
any way on economic performance. On the other hand, Participation in political action is 
shown to have some influence in Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
                                                 
38   V13: “I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is used to prevent environmental pollution.”  
39   Questions V19 to V34 listed types of organizations, such as trade unions, human rights movements, women’s 
groups. Respondents were asked to state whether they belonged to or did unpaid work for such organizations. 
40   see Belongs to some organization. 
41   Questions V242 to V246 asked respondents to state for several forms of political action whether they had ever done, 
might do or would never do them.   21
1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one system 
of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported. 
Table 10, mostly via INGO (columns 3, 6 and 9). It also directly impacts on performance 
when using Constitutional democracy or Executive constraints as institutional proxies (col-
umns 4 and 7). A sweeping interpretation could be that it is not monetary but real participa-
tion that matters. 
 (6) Propensity to Accept Hierarchies 
The propensity to accept hierarchies has been conjectured to be detrimental to economic de-
velopment, primarily due to its expected indirect effect of a higher willingness to accept insti-
tutions not conducive to development. As a proxy for this, we rely on the dimension Power 
Distance found in the GLOBE project and defined as “the degree to which members of an or-
ganization or society expect and agree that power should be shared unequally” (Carl, Gupta 
& Javidan (2004: 537)). 
Question V127 from the WVS asks respondents whether “one should follow instructions of 
one’s superiors (at work) even when one does not fully agree with them”, we call this one 
Hierarchy acceptance (WVS).  
The common factor, Hierarchy acceptance, does not seem to be relevant for economic per-
formance (Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried 
out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one system of equations, estimated with 
GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported. 
Table 11). 
 (7) Shared Lesser Virtues 
Virtues such as honesty, trust and thriftiness are conjectured to keep transaction costs low 
which should have positive effects on economic development. Unfortunately, it is not easy to 
find indicators that cover these secondary virtues in their entirety. Among the nine dimensions 
contained in the GLOBE project, one dimension does, however, reflect part of the conjecture 
that we have in mind. This is Future orientation which is defined (Ashkanasy, Gupta, May-
field & Trevor-Roberts (2004: 285)) as “the extent to which members of a society or an or-
ganization believe that their current actions will influence their future, focus on investment in 
their future, believe that they will have a future that matters, believe in planning for develop-
ing their future, and look far into the future for assessing the effects of their current actions.” 
Without future orientation, there will be no investment. Since investments are one key to eco-  22
nomic development, we argue that high values of future orientation should have an impact on 
the economic development of a society. 
There is some evidence that Future orientation (common factor) is relevant for economic per-
formance (Table 12). It shows a (weakly) significant effect via INGO (columns 3, 6 and 9) 
and Rule of law (column 2). 
6  Conclusions and Outlook 
It has become somewhat of a commonplace to claim that institutions matter for economic de-
velopment. The endogeneity of institutions is often mentioned but not explicitly inquired into. 
In this paper, we develop a number of hypotheses how values and norms could impact upon 
some of the institutions conjectured to be relevant for economic development. Drawing on a 
simultaneous equation approach, we examine the influence of various values and norms on 
economic performance, both directly (total factor productivity) and indirectly via institutions 
(rule of law, constitutionalized democracy, constraints on the executive) and civil society 
(proxied for by the number of international non-governmental organizations active in a given 
country). The first conclusion is that some values and norms indeed matter for economic de-
velopment, although we do not know much yet about the precise transmission channels. Our 
estimations show that it seems crucial to explicitly allow for an indirect effect via Civil society. 
Furthermore, the impact of values and norms greatly depends on the choice of institutional 
proxy. Additional theoretical underpinning but also more analysis on the transmission chan-
nels is desirable. The finding that the factors proxying for the values Inequality accepted and 
Hierarchy acceptance do not exert any significant influence on economic development either 
directly or indirectly certainly is a surprise. 
Are there any policy conclusions we can draw from these results? Certainly we do not pro-
pose that values and norms can be molded in order to achieve superior economic performance, 
at least not in the short run. But a deeper insight into the interaction between formal and in-
formal institutions (including values and norms) can help policy makers improve decisions 
regarding formal institutions.   23
7  Tables   24
Table 1: Variables used (with descriptive statistics) 
Name  Source and Description  Mean S.D.  Min  Max 
TFP  Natural logarithm of total factor productivity, own calculation for 2000 based on Hall & Jones (1999).  7.34  0.35  6.51  8.07 
Rule of Law index 
World Bank. Rule of law measures the extent to which individuals “have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particularly, the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and vi-
olence.” Kaufman et al. (2007: 4).  0.00 1.00 -2.31 2.20 
Constitutionalized democracy  
Polity IV. “Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and pro-
cedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the exis-
tence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all 
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.” Marshall & Jaggers (2004: 13).  2.94  6.62 
-
10.00 10.00 
Constraints on the executive   Polity IV. Measures “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities.“ Marshall & Jaggers (2004: 23).  4.71  2.09  1.00  7.00 
Number of international NGOs 
(log) 
Paxton (2002). Number of international non-governmental organizations (INGO) present in a country (logarithm). 
6.55 0.86 4.50 8.17 
Individual responsibility 
(WVS) 
See 5 for detailed description. 
0.00 1.00 -1.91 1.81 
Performance orientation 
(GLOBE) 
See 5 for detailed description. 
0.00 1.00 -2.04 2.14 
Inequality acceptance (WVS)  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -2.18 2.53 
Uncertainty avoidance  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -1.92 1.71 
Equal treatment  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -1.68 2.68 
Contribution to public good  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -1.27 4.25 
Participation in political action  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -2.17 2.06 
Hierarchy acceptance  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -2.35 1.93 
Future orientation (GLOBE)  See 5 for detailed description.  0.00 1.00 -1.58 2.55 
Absolute Distance from equa-
tor 
Distance from equator, normalized to a scale from 0 to 1. 
0.27 0.18 0.00 0.71 
Years of Schooling  World Bank (2005): Years of schooling. Missing data were imputed by augmenting the data in Hall and Jones for 1985 
(originally provided by Barro & Lee (1993)) with the average growth rate in schooling between 1985 and 2000  5.21  2.75  0.54  12.04 
Frankel/Romer trade instru-
ment 
Frankel & Romer (1999): Natural log of trade share predicted by a gravity model of international trade which takes both a 
country’s population and its geographical location into account.  1.03  1.98  -1.00  5.64 
Constitutionalized democracy 
1995 




Ethnic fractionalization  Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003): Index of ethnic fractionalization.  0.44  0.28 -1.00 0.93 
Muslim fraction  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1999): Muslim population share.  22.70  34.01  0.00  99.50 
Hydrocarbon production  McArthur & Sachs (2001): Hydrocarbon Production per Capita in 1993 (log).  0.69  4.58  -4.61  10.59 
Malaria transmission index  McArthur & Sachs (2001): Malaria Transmission Index in 1994.  0.29  0.41  0.00  1.00   25




















Individual  responsibility  (WVS)  1          
Performance  orientation  (GLOBE)  -0.127  1         
Inequality  acceptance  (WVS)  -0.0857  0.0693  1        
Uncertainty  avoidance  -0.5737*  -0.2960*  0.0547  1       
Equal treatment  -0.6551*  0.3333 0.3713*  0.4650*  1         
Contribution to public good  0.0601  0.3127  -0.065  -0.2497  -0.1372  1       
Participation in political  0.3653*  0.0721  0.0324  -0.4996*  -0.5483*  0  1     
Hierarchy acceptance  -0.1162  -0.4998*  -0.2528 0.3306* 0.0248 -0.4470* -0.1535  1   
Future orientation (GLOBE)  0.4724*  0.5366*  -0.02 -0.7879*  -0.271 0.4488*  0.4533*  -0.4758*  1 
*indicates  5%  significance.           
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Table 3: Control variables 
Variable  Set of control variables 
TFP (log) 
Years of Schooling 
Hydrocarbon Production per Capita in 1993 (log) 
Malaria Transmission Index in 1994 
Number of international NGOs (log) 
Absolute Distance from Equator 
Hydrocarbon Production per Capita in 1993 (log) 
Frankel/Romer trade instrument 
Rule of Law index (World Bank) 
Years of Schooling 
Absolute Distance from Equator 
Frankel/Romer trade instrument 
Constitutionalized democracy 2000 (Polity IV) 
Muslim Fraction 
Constitutionalized democracy 1995 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV) 
Absolute Distance from Equator 
Muslim Fraction 
Frankel/Romer trade instrument 
   27
Table 4: Individual responsible for achieving goals (a) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Individual responsibility (WVS)  0.029  0.416  0.217 0.147 1.017  0.28  0.155 0.249 0.287 
 0.77  2.26*  3.30**  4.50**  1.55 4.41**  4.25** 0.82 4.49** 
Number of international NGOs (log)   -0.832    -0.102     0.64   
   1.44    0.06    0.64  
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.337                 
  4.45**          
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)     0.005       
      0.77       
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV)              0.004     
         0.13    
Constant  7.918 4.016 6.303 7.713 3.597 6.407 7.705 0.151 6.407 
 81.41**  1.09  45.56**  90.07**  0.29 44.37**  42.75** 0.02 44.05** 
Observations  61 61 61 55 55 55 55 55 55 
R-squared  0.65 0.42 0.62 0.54 0.78 0.65 0.53 0.65 0.64 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   28
Table 5: Individual responsible for achieving goals (b) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 



















Performance orientation (GLOBE)  -0.026  0.344  0.107  0.03  -0.05  0.098 0.041 -0.345 0.103 
  1.01 2.65** 1.53  0.95  0.11 1.32 1.16 1.27  1.4 
Number of international NGOs (log)   -0.354    2.473     3.62   
   0.32    1.15     2.19*   
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.243                 
  4.77**          
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      0.011       
      1 . 6        
Constraints  on  the  executive  (Polity  IV)         0.099    
         2.45*    
Constant 7.781  0.852  6.223  7.59  -16.432 6.252  7.103 -18.656 6.167 
  98.20** 0.13 36.95**  87.76** 1.04 34.03**  32.61** 1.77 33.53** 
Observations  52 52 52 48 48 48 48 48 48 
R-squared  0.71 0.63 0.49  0.5 0.78  0.49 0.4 -0.49  0.49 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   29
Table 6: Inequality acceptance 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Inequality acceptance (WVS)  0.012  -0.048  -0.064  -0.018 -0.063 -0.093 -0.008 -0.121 -0.084 
  0.45 0.45 1.11 0.56 0.23 1.6 0.21  0.94  1.45 
Number of international NGOs (log)   -0.479    1.083    1.498  
   0.86    1.04     2.14*   
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.366                 
  5.20**          
Constitutionalized democracy (Polity IV)        0.015           
      1.88       
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV)              0.074     
         1.71    
Constant  7.929 1.642 6.201 7.594 -6.493 6.217 7.286 -5.524 6.182 
  72.50** 0.48 42.77**  80.82** 0.88 39.98**  34.39** 1.23 39.09** 
Observations  59 59 59 53 53 53 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.61  0.49  0.56  0.4  0.84 0.56 0.42 0.59 0.56 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   30
Table 7: No aversion against unknown 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Uncertainty avoidance  0.164  -0.773  -0.212  -0.134 0.488 -0.176 -0.132 0.407 -0.173 
 0.85  4.05**  3.39**  5.08**  0.63 2.79**  4.65** 1.58 2.73** 
Number of international NGOs (log)    -0.878     2.356     2.08   
   1.24    0.81    1.88  
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.456                 
  1 . 5 8           
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      0.011       
      2.11*       
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV)              0.045     
         1.53    
Constant  7.916 5.405 6.723 7.751  -16.183 6.634  7.549  -9.817  6.624 
 70.47**  1.12  44.13**  104.24**  0.76 43.01**  47.43** 1.29 42.77** 
Observations  42 42 42 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.44  0.71  0.66  0.68 0.82 0.67 0.66 0.55 0.67 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   31
Table 8: Equality of treatment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 



















Equal treatment  -0.037  -0.723  -0.231  -0.073 0.169 -0.265 -0.081 -0.166 -0.249 
 0.88  1.51  2.53*  1.64  0.13 3.30** 1.41  0.19 3.07** 
Number of international NGOs (log)   -3.184    2.082    2.115  
    2.05*     0.56    0.77  
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.317                 
  1 . 5           
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      0.003       
      0.34       
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV)              0.002     
         0.04    
Constant 7.92  20.053  6.709  7.664  -14.224 6.761  7.658  -9.855  6.731 
  42.63** 1.92 37.11**  71.51** 0.52 37.71**  24.00** 0.53 36.84** 
Observations  32 32 32 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.57 -1.14 0.55 0.45  0.8  0.62 0.44 0.51 0.62 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   32
Table 9: Interest in the public good (a) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Contribution to public good  -0.02  0.05  -0.066  0.02  0.084 -0.068 0.019 0.016 -0.062 
  0.6  0.38 1.22 0.58 0.51 1.23 0.54 0.11  1.1 
Number of international NGOs (log)   -0.33    -0.223    2.923  
   0.36    0.28     3.44**   
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.336                 
  4.71**          
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      -0.002       
      0.15       
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV)              0.074     
         0.72    
Constant 7.803  0.74  6.383  7.706  3.364 6.476 7.262  -14.951  6.453 
 73.28**  0.13  38.71**  58.76**  0.6 37.64**  12.35**  2.71**  35.95** 
Observations  41 41 41 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-squared  0.62 0.54 0.62 0.52 0.94 0.59 0.53  0.4  0.58 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   33
Table 10: Interest in the public good (b) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Participation in political action  0.009  0.306  0.153 0.114 -0.047 0.147 0.103 -0.184 0.15 
 0.25  2.26*  2.89**  3.55**  0.25 2.74**  2.48*  1.06 2.77** 
Number of international NGOs (log)   -0.399    0.008    2.636  
   0.61    0.01     3.20**   
Rule  of  Law  index  (World  Bank)  0.341          
  4.43**          
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      -0.009       
      0 . 7 4        
Constraints  on  the  executive  (Polity  IV)         0.014    
         0 . 1 2     
Constant  7.814 1.555 6.473 7.798 1.643 6.511 7.628  -13.165  6.537 
  72.09** 0.37 42.57**  61.88** 0.29 41.40**  11.28**  2.43*  40.14** 
Observations  41 41 41 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-squared  0.61 0.59 0.67 0.61 0.94 0.65 0.62  0.5  0.64 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   34
Table 11: Propensity to accept hierarchies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Hierarchy acceptance  0.045  -0.259  0.015  -0.02 0.511  -0.019  -0.015  -0.016  -0.017 
 1.54  1.7  0.24  0.55  1.33 0.32 0.37 0.09 0.28 
Number of international NGOs (log)    -0.792     0.773     2.585   
   0.82    0.37     2.04*   
Rule of Law index (World Bank)  0.25                 
  4.11**          
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      0.017       
      2.35*       
Constraints on the executive (Polity IV)              0.103     
         2.56*    
Constant 7.782  4.109  6.454  7.659  -4.751 6.495 7.153  -12.933  6.444 
  87.99** 0.66 41.94**  77.18** 0.31 41.06**  37.32** 1.51 40.35** 
Observations  41 41 41 37 37 37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.73  0.47  0.57  0.47 0.83 0.59 0.38 0.44  0.6 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.   35
Table 12: Shares lesser virtues 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 TFP  (log) 




















Future orientation (GLOBE)  -0.062  0.446  0.172 0.071 -0.762 0.203  0.06  -0.645 0.181 
  1.59  2.52* 2.47* 2.27*  1.2 2.82** 1.8  1.88 2.50* 
Number of international NGOs (log)    -0.411     3.147     3.517   
   0.42    1.18     2.01*   
Rule  of  Law  index  (World  Bank)  0.28          
  4.05**          
Constitutionalized  democracy  (Polity  IV)      0.009       
      1 . 3 2        
Constraints  on  the  executive  (Polity  IV)         0.073    
         1 . 9 7     
Constant  7.765 1.615 6.378 7.633  -21.173 6.439  7.265 -18.524 6.351 
  98.04** 0.26 36.24**  88.26** 1.08 35.18**  35.88** 1.63 34.06** 
Observations  52 52 52 48 48 48 48 48 48 
R-squared  0.7  0.66 0.53 0.52 0.78 0.52 0.47 -0.31 0.53 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimations were carried out using the 3 stage least squares procedure. Each set of three columns represents one 
system of equations, estimated with GLS using instrumented values for the endogenous variables. Control variables are not reported.  36
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